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Abstract
This paper contributes theoretically, empirically and methodologically to the literature on 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs). This study is guided by two associated research 
questions: ‘How are TANs structured?’ and ‘What relation is established between the 
TANs’ structure and their efficiency?’ The paper shows that environmental transnational 
advocacy networks are not as horizontal as assumed in the TANs literature. Elements of 
hierarchy are present in networks through highly connected and/or strategically positioned 
nodes. This paper shows that elements of hierarchy are introduced in networks to facili-
tate information exchange and decision-making. The paper studies for the first time the 
TAN advocating the ban of cyanide-based mining in Europe in the late 2000s–early 2010s. 
The network aimed to impact the EU environmental legislative framework, as well as con-
tribute to the implementation of international agreements on pollution prevention and bio-
diversity protection. This study draws on extensive fieldwork (including interviews with 
forty-five members of the network) conducted in several European countries in which the 
network developed and maintains branches. The study innovates methodologically by com-
bining content analysis and social network analysis in the process of determining the more 
central actors of the network studied.
Keywords Transnational advocacy networks · Hybrids · Gold mining · European Union · 
Social network analysis
1 Introduction
The proliferation of transnational networks led to an increasing interest among interna-
tional relations scholars in investigating their role in world politics (Castells 1996; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Kahler 2009a; Yanacopulos 2009). Although 
progress has been achieved recently in documenting transnational networks, the way these 
networks form, their structure, the way they operate and the degree to which they impact on 
 * Alexandra-Maria Bocse 
 a.bocse@lse.ac.uk; alexandra.maria.bocse@gmail.com
1 Fellow in International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton 
Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
 A.-M. Bocse 
1 3
world governance remain matters of debate (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Kahler 2009a; Eil-
strup-Sangiovanni 2009; Maoz 2012). Particularly, the analysis of the relationship between 
the networks’ structure and the way they function is underexplored in the literature. This 
study is guided by two associated research questions: ‘How are TANs structured?’ and 
‘What relation is established between the TANs’ structure and their efficiency?’
While the networks’ success is typically considered to be based on their horizontal 
structure, this paper offers insight into the hierarchy accommodated by transnational advo-
cacy networks in order to improve their performance. The paper finds that claims related 
to the presence of hierarchy in networks made by Carpenter (2011) and Lake and Wong 
(2009) in relation to security and, respectively, human rights networks are valid also for 
environmental transnational advocacy networks.
In the last two decades, we witnessed the proliferation of literature that analyzes the 
role that transnational networks can play as promoters of international norms and standards 
(environmental, labor, human rights, etc.) (starting with the seminal work of Keck and Sik-
kink 1998). Most of this literature is qualitative, very few studies provide us with network 
maps, and very few systematically analyze the relations established among the network 
members. Although this study also draws heavily on a qualitative methodology, it supple-
ments its findings with social network analysis (SNA) that is also useful in the process of 
generating network maps. Very often the Politics and International Studies literature is lim-
ited to using the concept of ‘network’ as a metaphor. The ‘network society’ (Castells 1996) 
is a concept that has benefited from a lot of interest from both academia and media. The 
data collected for this study, in depth and in a systematic manner, capture a section of this 
‘network society’ and contribute to grounding empirically the network metaphor that in 
recent years has occupied a central place in the process of theorizing about contemporary 
society and politics.
This research studies the case of a Central and Eastern European (CEE) transnational 
advocacy network calling for the banning of cyanide-based mining in several EU countries 
and then in the whole EU, given its potential to harm the environment. This informal social 
structure will be referred to as the cyanide ban network (CBN). During its EU-wide cam-
paign, the CBN advocated for ‘a general ban on the use of cyanide mining technologies 
in the European Union’ (The European Parliament 2010, 1). The ban was framed by its 
supporters as being demanded by the ‘precautionary principle, as set out in the Rio Dec-
laration on Environment and Development and in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
adopted in Rio de Janeiro’ (Ader et al. 2010, 2). The CBN referred to cyanide as being a 
very toxic chemical whose use comes with a high risk of harming the environment, pollut-
ing waters and negatively impacting biodiversity. To illustrate their arguments, advocates 
pointed to previous cases of water contamination and biodiversity damage happening in the 
CEE. For example, the 30 January 2000 cyanide spill at a gold and silver production plant 
in Baia Mare (Northwestern Romania) brought irreversible damage to the biodiversity of 
the Tisza River and affected the quality of water in the Danube (The UN Environmental 
Program/The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2000). The EU ban 
was also presented by the network as contributing to the implementation of the 1994 Sofia 
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube. 
The convention is targeted at preventing transboundary pollution and, among others, pollu-
tion originating in the mining sector.
A transnational advocacy network is defined as a set of: ‘relevant actors working inter-
nationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, 
and a dense exchange of information and services’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). TANs are 
transnational networks ‘organized to promote causes, principled ideas and norms, and they 
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often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a ration-
alist understanding of their interests’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 9). In the case of TANs, the 
factors that motivate action are the intellectual and emotional dedication of the participants 
(Rodrigues 2004). Throughout the paper, the TAN actors will be referred to more broadly 
as activists or advocates.
The classification of the social structure working toward the ban of cyanide-based min-
ing as a TAN is based on the data collected and the analysis conducted by the author of 
this study. It is also a term that most of the actors operating in this network found to cap-
ture well their relationships (as indicated by the interviews with several network members: 
EAH5, EAB2, EAG1, EAG3, EAR21). In the process of classifying the social structure 
discussed in the article as a TAN, alternative concepts such as ‘advocacy coalition’ or 
‘lobby group’ were contemplated, but they turned out to be less able to capture the social 
reality uncovered through fieldwork on this case study.
Advocacy networks emerge around environmental and human rights concerns, areas 
that are traditionally related to the field of ‘low politics,’ but also in relation to areas that 
present an important stake for state and global security, associated with ‘high politics’ 
(Price 1998; Carpenter 2011; Carpenter and Jose 2012). Environmental concerns are quite 
likely to generate transnational networked action. Cross-border pollution, ecological inter-
dependence and the need to properly manage the global commons have motivated both 
public and private actors to act across national boundaries (Held et al. 1999; Mason 2001). 
Environmental TANs have emerged, for example, around efforts to stop tropical deforesta-
tion in the Brazilian Amazon (the Planafloro and Polonoroeste campaigns) or in the Malay-
sian state of Sarawak (Keck and Sikkink 1998), as well as around the struggle against the 
construction of dams and power plants that pose environmental threats in Southeast Asia 
(Rumansara 2000; Royo 2000; Rodrigues 2004).
The cyanide ban network is a case well worth investigating for several reasons. First, 
it depicts the emergence of a transnational advocacy network based in Central and East-
ern Europe, a region where the environmental civil society has been previously considered 
weak (Howard 2003; Welch 2004; Romantan 2006; Buzogány 2009). This way, the study 
also contributes to the rather scarce literature on civil society in post-communist Europe 
(exceptions being Howard 2003; Parau 2009; Ekiert and Kubik 2014; Cox and Gallai 
2014; Torsello 2016). Second, the study represents a valuable empirical contribution to the 
TAN literature being the first to analyze the cyanide ban opposition in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the TAN framework. In this way, the paper aims to respond to the need to expand 
the set of case studies on international networks and particularly transnational advocacy 
networks (Kahler 2009a; Carpenter 2011). Third, and most important, this case allows for 
the study of hybrid networks operating in environmental advocacy. As it will be shown in 
more detail later, elements of centralization are included in the structure of the otherwise 
flat network to improve information exchange and decision-making in the network.
The paper begins by introducing the theoretical framework and research design adopted 
by this study. The second section introduces the CBN and the context of its emergence. 
The third section brings both qualitative and quantitative evidence in support of the 
CBN’s hierarchical social structure, revealing network hubs defined as nodes2 that are well 
1 Please see the bibliography for an explanation of the abbreviations.
2 ‘Node’ is the concept used in social network analysis to refer to the network ‘members,’ ‘participants,’ 
‘activists,’ ‘advocates.’ These concepts will be used interchangeable in the text, with the concept of ‘node’ 
being used mainly in the section dedicated to social network analysis.
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connected in the network (Kahler 2009b). The fourth section provides insight into the fac-
tors that led to the emergence of hubs. Although the horizontality of networks is usually 
considered to be a positive feature, the paper shows that a certain degree of hierarchy is 
introduced by the network members to facilitate communication and decision-making in 
the TAN. The concluding part of the paper makes some final remarks and points toward 
new avenues for research.
2  Theoretical framework and research design
Scholars argue the concept of ‘network’ is well suited in accommodating a diversity of 
actors (Witte et  al. 2005), of relative equal standing and loosely connected (Zanini and 
Edwards 2001). Horizontality is considered a central defining feature of the network form 
of organization. According to an influential study on TANs, networks are ‘forms of organ-
ization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication 
and exchange’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8). The accommodation of hierarchical features 
in advocacy networks started to be acknowledged by the literature with the work of Bob 
(2005), Lake and Wong (2009) and Carpenter (2011). The work of Carpenter (2011) and 
Lake and Wong (2009) discusses network hubs and hierarchy in relation to security and 
human rights networks. This study aims to contribute to the literature acknowledging that 
TANs present elements of hierarchy in their structure by detecting and studying hierarchy 
in an environmental network. It also discusses the factors that led to the inclusion of hierar-
chy in the structure of the network.
Networks are contrasted with the hierarchies that characterize state organization, on the 
one hand, and the temporary relations typical of markets, on the other hand (Powell 1990; 
Thompson 2003; Kahler 2009a). Networks are thought to have a series of organizational 
advantages over hierarchies given their horizontality: facilitation of communication and 
information exchange (Powell 1990; Baker and Faulkner 1993; Podolny and Page 1998), 
adaptability to contextual changes (Thompson 2003; Kenney et  al. 2013) and increased 
learning capacity (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Kenney 2006; Kenney et al. 2013).
The CBN was set up to exchange information and allow different segments of the 
network to learn from each other in their campaigning work. In a hierarchical structure, 
information often needs to pass through a central unit, causing possible communication 
delays. Proponents of networks claim that the flat structure of networks allows for rapid 
information exchange between central and peripheral nodes (Watts 2003; Powell 1990). 
The network form of organization is also thought to be superior in fostering learning (Pow-
ell 1990; Uzzi 1997; Podolny and Page 1998). Learning takes place when the members of 
an organization accumulate, analyze and act on new data which may lead to the change 
of individual and network practices (Levitt and March 1988; Kenney 2007, 2009; Kenney 
et al. 2013). Networks facilitate learning for several reasons. First, the network links act as 
effective communication channels that allow for the spread of good practice from one node 
to another (Hamel 1991). Second, as shown by Powell and Brantley (1992), networks fos-
ter learning by facilitating the synthesis of new information, distinct from the data initially 
possessed by different network nodes. The stable and sustained exchange generates new 
knowledge, and in this way the network, rather than the nodes that comprise the network, 
becomes a space of innovation (Podolny and Page 1998).
However, there is also literature on networks indicating that the lack of hierarchy can 
make networks poor information transmitters and learning spaces (Powell 1990; Thompson 
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2003; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009). The search for 
information in networks that are decentralized can be difficult and the lack of organiza-
tional memory administered by designated authorities impedes effective learning. Net-
works can also display poor and slow decision-making as virtually all network members 
are involved in the decision-making process (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). Intro-
ducing elements of hierarchy in the network structure can overcome some of the shortcom-
ings of decentralized, horizontal structures with equal members. The literature on terrorist 
networks indicates that centralization is crucial in conducting sophisticated terrorist attacks 
(Helfstein 2009; Enders and Su 2007). The study on terror networks undertaken by Ender 
and Jindapon shows that more centralized networks are better at mobilizing their members, 
members are better connected and more able to respond to change (Enders and Jindapon 
2009).
To address some of the shortcomings of decentralization, hybrids emerge by ‘combining 
constituents that are networked with those that resemble hierarchies or markets’ (Hafner-
Burton et al. 2009, 582). Hybrids are defined as:
networks that include hierarchies among their nodes or networks with nodes that 
wield power within the network through centrality or other structural character-
istics. A network with relatively few well-connected nodes (hubs) may introduce 
hierarchy into the ‘flatness’ and apparent egalitarianism of network spaces (Kahler 
2009b, 106).
In a network, there might or might not be formal recognition of the de facto hierarchy 
that characterizes the network: ‘in a highly centralized network with a few hubs that are 
linked to most of the other nodes, authority may inhere to position, without formal rec-
ognition’ (Kahler 2009b, 112).
Well-connected nodes tend to occupy a more central position in the network and have 
more relational power. If in the power as currency/attributional power approach the 
power of each actor is dependent on the possession of weapons, financial resources, per-
sonnel, etc., the relational approach to power argues the actor’s position in the network 
shapes its power to influence decision-making (Krahmann 2003b). The concept of rela-
tional power rejects attempts to explain human behavior as caused only by the categori-
cal attributes of individual or collective actors and generates explanations that are based 
on the involvement of actors in structured social relations (Emirbayer and Goodwin 
1994, 1414). This study responds to calls in literature to move beyond identity-based 
explanations of social action and embrace explanations drawing on: ‘commonality, con-
nectedness, and groupness’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 20).
Brokers are a particular type of well-connected nodes (or hubs) and tend to possess 
substantial relational power. Brokers reduce the ‘network segmentation’ (Diani 2003). 
Several scholars wrote on the power that brokers possess given their ability to connect 
actors or network segments that would remain disconnected in their absence. Such stud-
ies cover transnational activist networks (Carpenter 2011), terrorist networks (Enders 
and Su 2007) or state networks (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009). Brokers ‘facilitate informa-
tion sharing—and learning—throughout the network as they pass along knowledge and 
other resources to less well-connected agents’ (Kenney et  al. 2013, p. 740). Brokers 
have a privileged position in policy subsystems and policy networks they are part of.
The investigation of the structure of the cyanide ban network and of the factors that 
generate its hybridity was conducted through participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews with forty-five members of the CBN, twenty-two of which are explicitly refer-
enced in this paper. Semi-structured interviews are suitable for studying the structure and 
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dynamics of still underexplored social structures, such as TANs. They allow for the discov-
ery of new facts and patterns, while making sure the data gathered are comparable (Gill-
ham 2005).
Interviews were conducted between August 2010 and April 2011. The interviewees 
include a wide variety of actors, from representatives of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to scientists, from members of local movements to high governmental officials 
or Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) located in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Greece and Belgium. Preference was given to face-to-face interviewing whenever possi-
ble. During face-to-face interviewing, the ‘rapport,’ defined as the mutual reading of the 
presentation of self between the interviewer and interviewee (Fontana and Frey 1994), was 
easily created and this led to a high degree of disclosure. Six interviews were conducted 
online through a videoconferencing platform (Skype). Given that the interviewees were 
environmental activists who use this platform daily, the level of disclosure was similar to 
the one in face-to-face interviews.
In selecting the interviewees, as a first step, I generated an initial list of potential inter-
viewees by relying on publicly available information (documents, websites and newspaper 
articles). The initial list was gradually expanded using names mentioned by the network 
members during the interviews. This procedure is known in the literature as the snowball 
technique: ‘the technique of building an exponentially increasing network of research sub-
jects from an original subject zero’ (Gusterson 2008, 98). Clearly defining the bounda-
ries of social networks can be challenging. By allowing the author of this study to access 
the network sample gradually, the snowball technique allowed for capturing the network 
boundaries (Goodman 1961; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Interviewing stopped when ‘sat-
uration’ (as defined by Burnham et al. 2008) was reached, that is, when no new additional 
data emerged through interviewing and the data gathered allowed for an in-depth under-
standing of the network structure and dynamics.
As part of the interview process, network members were asked: ‘Who did you coop-
erate with in the campaign to ban cyanide in gold mining in the EU?’ The connections 
between the network members reported in the answers were analyzed using social network 
analysis. Social network analysis allows for measuring, mapping and analyzing contacts 
among a group of actors (or ‘nodes’), which may be human or nonhuman (John and Cole 
1998). The network actors and the links between them are illustrated in this paper through 
graphical displays, called sociograms (Wasserman and Faust 1994; John and Cole 1998). 
The analysis was conducted at the level of individuals, not organizations. Two actors were 
considered connected if at least one of them provided the other with information and/or 
campaigning advice. Data were recorded in an Excel spreadsheet and SNA was performed 
using NodeXL. The sociograms included in this paper were also generated with NodeXL.
This study uses two centrality measures to identify nodes that are central to the network, 
the hubs: ‘degree centrality’ and ‘betweenness centrality,’ both computed with NodeXL. 
Degree centrality refers to the number of connections3 a node of the network has with 
other nodes, a high number implying a high degree centrality (John and Cole 1998). This 
research will follow Freeman (1979) and Goddard (2009) and will look at the measure 
of betweenness centrality to identify the brokers in the network (Goddard 2009). A high 
betweenness centrality is generated by the position of the actor as a connector between dif-
ferent sections of the network (John and Cole 1998, Gulati et al. 2002). The computing of 
3 The concepts ‘connection’ and ‘link’ between nodes are used interchangeably in this study.
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the two centrality measures allowed to determine the presence of central actors in the CBN. 
Before moving to discussing these central actors and the implication of their presence for 
the structure of the CBN, the paper will briefly introduce the network, its formation pro-
cess and membership.
3  The cyanide ban network
Gold mining led in the late 2000s to public controversy in several Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries, as multinational mining companies expressed an interest in 
developing gold mining projects. Some of the projects were located in areas where gold 
was previously extracted in underground mining facilities run by state-owned companies 
(Richards 2005; Damigos and Kaliampakos 2006). Gold reserves in these regions were 
reduced and mining was found to be unprofitable by governments, so mines were closed. 
However, a few years later the steady increase in the price of gold (Bank of England 2011) 
and the development of more advanced gold extraction technology made it profitable for 
multinationals to mine the gold. The proposed technology for mining gold is cyanide leach-
ing, a procedure that implies the dislocation of the rock bearing gold, the ore and its treat-
ment with sodium cyanide acting as a magnate attracting the precious metal. The cyanide 
resulting from gold processing is stored in large tailings ponds.
Although there was an agreement between many of the EU governments and the Euro-
pean Union that cyanide leaching is the best available gold extraction technology from an 
environmental point of view (The European Commission 2010), this method was deemed 
by certain scientists, NGOs and local movements as posing high environmental risks (Buza 
et  al. 2001). Advocates of a cyanide ban pointed to the devastating accidents associated 
with cyanide-based mining that took place in CEE countries and worldwide in previous 
years. In addition to the environmental damage, open cast cyanide-based mining projects 
often implied the dislocation of local inhabitants from several settlements in CEE countries 
and Greece (Damigos and Kaliampakos 2006; Richards 2005).
The opposition to this type of mining technology took the form of a transnational advo-
cacy network. The CBN emerged as a social structure around a series of campaigns to 
ban cyanide-based mining. Campaigns to ban cyanide-based mining took place in Romania 
(starting in 2007), Bulgaria (starting in 2008), Hungary (starting in 2009), Greece (starting 
in 2010). Although they appear to be national in scope, each of these campaigns involved 
also foreign activists that contributed to the campaign mainly with information and advice. 
In this way, the network acquired a strong international dimension.
The Romanian campaign to ban cyanide-based mining started in 2007. The campaign 
was led by a NGO coalition and the legislative proposal had the strong backing of two 
Senators in the Romanian Parliament (EAR6). After a series of initial successes registered 
by the campaigners, the industrial counter-lobby managed to reach the Industry Commit-
tee of the Lower Chamber in the Romanian Parliament and blocked the ban legislation 
adoption procedure4 (EAR6, EAR8). A campaign for banning cyanide-based mining began 
in Bulgaria in 2008, inspired by the Romanian campaign (EAR1, EAB2). A legislative 
proposal to ban cyanide in Bulgaria was drafted by the NGOs and tabled by the leader of 
4 On April 15, 2008, the Romanian cyanide ban bill, after being debated by the Chamber of Deputies, 
was sent back to the Industry Commission of the Chamber for a second examination. There the process of 
achieving the ban was blocked.
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the Bulgarian right-wing Unified People’s Party (EAB3). The proposal was supported by 
a coalition of domestic NGOs and local social movements. The approx. 14,000 signatures 
collected in the autumn of 2008 in favor of the ban of cyanide in gold mining were submit-
ted to the National Parliament as proof of the public support for the ban (EAB1, EAB3). 
However, the legislative proposal was eventually rejected with a 15-vote difference, in a 
240-seat Assembly.
The failure of the campaigns in Romania and Bulgaria triggered the Hungarian cam-
paign to nationally ban cyanide-based mining in 2009. The environmental activists in Hun-
gary aimed to set a ban example in Central and Eastern Europe rather than deal with imme-
diate domestic cyanide threats (EAH1, EAH4). They hoped that other countries in the 
region will follow in adopting a ban. The mining projects that worried first and foremost 
the Hungarian activists were the ones in neighboring Romania (EAH1, EAH4, EAH3, 
EAH5). On December 7, 2009, the prohibition of the use of cyanide-based technology 
in mining in Hungary was almost unanimously voted by the Hungarian Parliament. The 
successful Hungarian campaign inspired activists in Greece, where opposition to different 
gold mining projects had been persistent for over a decade (EAG1). The initiative to ban 
cyanide in Greece came from the academics at the University of Thessaloniki and not from 
the NGOs, as in the cases of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. In January–February 2010, 
around 300 signatures for a cyanide ban were collected from academics and students affili-
ated with the University of Thessaloniki and, although initially gathered to be submitted to 
national authorities, they were sent to the European Parliament (EAG1, EAG2).
The network reinforced its international dimension, especially during the campaign to 
ban cyanide-based mining in the entire European Union reaching a peak on May 5, 2010 
(the day when the European Parliament passed a Resolution demanding a ban on the use of 
cyanide-based mining technologies in the European Union). Having achieved a Hungarian 
ban, the Budapest-based NGOs took the initiative of an EU level campaign by contact-
ing Hungarian MEPs (EAH1) and captured particularly the attention of a Hungarian MEP, 
member of the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety. This MEP was soon joined by other MEPs, mainly from Hungary, Romania, 
Greece, Bulgaria, in drafting a resolution demanding a ban on the use of cyanide-based 
mining technologies in the EU before the end of 2011. The MEPs were lobbied by NGOs 
and social movements in CEE. The latter were also successful in mobilizing the Group of 
the Greens in the EP. On the day of the vote, May 5, 2010, the resolution passed with 448 
votes in favor, 48 against and 57 abstentions. Afterward, advocacy shifted to the European 
Commission in the attempt to turn the EP resolution into EU legislation.
The EU-wide campaign consolidated a TAN including, at its peak, in May 2010: rep-
resentatives of domestic NGOs, representatives of international non-governmental organi-
zations (INGOs), international environmental activists, politicians (MPs and MEPs), high 
governmental officials, scientists, representatives and volunteers of local social move-
ments.5 As will be shown in the next section, some network members are more central to 
the network than others generating hierarchy in the CBN.
5 It is often difficult to place a certain network member in a single category. In the CBN, there are situ-
ations when a volunteer in a local movement is also an NGO employee, a scientist is also a member of a 
local movement, or an individual is associated with an INGO and a domestic NGO. For social network 
analysis purposes, their primary affiliation was used.
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4  Hubs in the cyanide ban network
In identifying the existence of hubs in the network and who these hubs are, this paper tri-
angulated the description that interviewees gave on how the network is structured with 
the social network analysis (SNA) performed on the connections reported by the network 
members. Those connections facilitated the exchange of information and best practice 
leading to learning. This study will not discuss exchanges of financial resources, as the 
data collected did not find them to be as important as information exchanges in the work of 
the network. Both the qualitative interview data and the SNA indicate that certain network 
members are more central and influential in the network.
The interviewees indicated in their network description that the CBN has a ‘nerve 
center’ that consists of eleven persons. They stay connected through emailing, telephoning 
and the presence in a closed online group. People that constitute the nerve center work in 
the environmental protection field for a domestic or international NGO or are leaders of 
local movements that oppose the use of cyanide in specific mining projects. They acted as 
connectors between the campaigning groups based in several countries. These actors kept 
the communication alive across national boundaries. As discussed in the next paragraphs, 
at the same time the ‘nerve center’ kept connected segments of the network fulfilling 
certain specialized functions: providing information and legitimacy in the case of social 
movements, scientific evidence in the case of scientists and politically relevant information 
in the case of politicians.
Local social movements are connected to the international network through activists 
and representatives of NGOs in the case of the Romanian movement and through local 
leaders in the case of the movements based in Greece. The local movement in Bulgaria is 
connected to the international network through several INGOs and NGOs representatives. 
These connectors are part of the network’s ‘nerve center.’ Although less central to the CBN 
activity, local social movements are an important source of information and legitimacy for 
the actors at the core of the network (EAR2, EAR8, MEPA1, MEPA3).
The representatives of NGOs and INGOs in the ‘nerve center’ and demanding a cyanide 
ban based their arguments presented to politicians and to the public on scientific reports 
and information generated by scientists. In this regard, they acted as information brokers 
between scientists and politicians. The scientists opposing cyanide-based mining are con-
nected across borders mainly through NGOs and INGOs representatives (EAH1, EAB1). 
Some of the scientists whose work is referenced in the cyanide ban campaigns briefs are 
old acquaintances of the NGOs and INGOs representatives at the very core of the cya-
nide ban campaigns (EAR3, EAG2, EAG3, interview with the President of the Romanian 
Academy).
In addition to NGOs and INGOs representatives in the ‘nerve center,’ in the case of the 
CBN an important role in maintaining the connection between activists physically located 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Brussels-based political arena was played by a MEP 
assistant, working with the Hungarian MEP who initiated legislation demanding the ban-
ning of cyanide-based mining in the EU. Depending on their involvement in campaigns, 
politicians are more or less central to the network, but usually they rely on their staff to 
mediate the communication and information exchanges with the rest of the network. When 
asked about their cooperation with the Members of the European Parliament on achieving 
an EU-wide cyanide-based mining ban, a member central to the network indicated the two 
types of relationships that are established with politicians:
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there are two different levels, we have allies, whom we are working with, and we 
have supporters, who are kind of sympathetic to our cause […] The second category 
[the supporters]: we give them information, we update them about the case, but there 
are some MEPs with whom we have a closer connection [the allies]. We give them 
important material to speed up the process and sometimes they give us some infor-
mation and we embark in some action that is important to reach our common goals 
(EAH3).
 The qualitative findings on the presence of hubs in the CBN were confirmed also by the 
SNA performed on the network. The eleven actors the interviewees indicated are part of 
the ‘nerve center’ scored high in terms of both degree and betweenness centrality. Eight 
scored within the top ten degree centrality values and seven scored within the top ten 
betweenness centrality values. These actors are better connected with the other network 
actors, and these connections are also strategically more important for the information and 
good campaigning practice flows in the network. I start by introducing the degree centrality 
scores: (Table 1, Fig. 1)
Table 1  Degree centrality
Node Degree cen-
trality
Shape Color
MEPA1, MEP assistant 34 Solid square Red
EAH3, Representative of ‘Greenpeace’ Hungary 29 Solid square Red
EAH1, Representative of ‘Friends of the Earth’ Hungary 25 Solid square Red
EAR1, Representative of a Romanian social movement 24 Solid square Red
EAH2, Representative of ‘Bankwatch’ Hungary 24 Solid square Red
EAR3, Representative of a Romanian environmental NGO 23 Solid square Red
EAR2, Representative of a Romanian environmental NGO 20 Solid square Red
EAH4, Member of the Green Hungarian Party LMP, Member 
of the Hungarian Parliament
16 Solid square Red
EAR6, Representative of a Romanian environmental NGO 8 Solid square Black
EAH5, Volunteer at a Hungarian environmental NGO 8 Solid square Black
Fig. 1  Sociogram showcasing nodes with high degree centrality (The sociograms in Figs.  1 and 2 are a 
snapshot of the network as of 5 May 2010 reconstructed through SNA based on data collected through 
interviews (forty-five people were interviewed revealing connections with a larger number of entities). On 
that day, the European cyanide ban campaign reached its peak as the European Parliament passed the Reso-
lution demanding a ban on the use of cyanide mining technologies in the European Union). Solid square—
top 10 degree centrality. Disk—rest of the nodes. Red—nodes identified as central by the qualitative data. 
Black—rest of the nodes
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Nodes that appear on the figure as solid squares are the ten nodes with the highest 
degree centrality. Degree centrality for these nodes ranges from 34 (for a node connected 
with other 34 nodes) to 8 (for a node connected with other 8 nodes) (Table 1). The node 
with the highest degree centrality is the assistant of the Member of the European Parlia-
ment that initiated legislation banning cyanide-based mining at the EU level. One node is 
a Member of the Green Hungarian Party LMP and also a Member of the Hungarian Parlia-
ment. The other eight are representatives of INGOs, NGOs and social movements.
One of the problems with degree centrality is that it might just capture one’s belonging 
to a dense subgroup and not a node’s reach across the whole network (Mérand et al. 2011). 
Nodes belonging to the same national CBN segment are strongly connected with each 
other, which boosts a node’s centrality score, although that node might not hold important 
international connections. To help remedy this problem, the paper also looks at between-
ness centrality scores (Table 2, Fig. 2).
Table 2  Betweenness centrality
Node Betweenness 
centrality
Shape Color
MEPA1, MEP assistant 2152.586 Solid triangle Red
EAR1, Representative of a Romanian social movement 948.179 Solid triangle Red
EAH3, Representative of ‘Greenpeace’ Hungary 754.040 Solid triangle Red
EAR2, Representative of a Romanian environmental NGO 732.742 Solid triangle Red
EAR3, Representative of a Romanian environmental NGO 698.979 Solid triangle Red
EAH2, Representative of ‘Bankwatch’ Hungary 599.367 Solid triangle Red
EAH1, Representative of ‘Friends of the Earth’ Hungary 592.473 Solid triangle Red
EAR6, Representative of a Romanian environmental NGO 372.323 Solid triangle Black
AMBH, The Hungarian Ambassador to Romania 283.950 Solid triangle Black
EAH5, Volunteer at a Hungarian environmental NGO 146.625 Solid triangle Black
Fig. 2  Sociogram showcasing nodes with high betweenness centrality. Solid triangle—top 10 betweenness 
centrality. Disk—rest of the nodes. Red—nodes identified as central by the qualitative data. Black—rest of 
the nodes
 A.-M. Bocse 
1 3
Seven out of the eleven nodes identified through interviewing as central to the network 
were identified as such also by computing their betweenness centrality. Nodes that appear 
on the figure as solid triangles are the ten nodes with the highest betweenness centrality. 
Betweenness centrality for these nodes ranges from 2152.586 to 146.625 (Table 2). The 
node with the highest betweenness centrality is the assistant of the Member of the Euro-
pean Parliament initiating legislation banning cyanide-based mining at the European level. 
The other nine are representatives of INGOs, NGOs and social movements, as well as the 
Hungarian Ambassador to Romania. These actors exercise a monopoly in connecting dif-
ferent sections of the network and they are crucial in keeping alive information and good 
practice exchanges between the network sections.
The comparative analysis of Tables 1 and 2 shows there is a strong overlap between the 
network actors with the highest degree and betweenness centrality. The qualitative inter-
views also indicated these actors are central to the network and part of the ‘nerve center.’ 
This is important as it increases the confidence in the findings included in this paper. It 
also shows there are awareness and acceptance in the network for the central position that 
hubs occupy. These central network nodes tend to be representatives of INGOs, NGOs 
and social movements. This is not surprising given that they maintain the connections and 
mediate the information flow between national segments of the transnational network, local 
social movements and scientists, as well as stay in touch with the staff of relevant politi-
cians. While findings presented in this section indicate that certain actors are more central 
to the network, the next section will discuss the factors that led to this.
5  Explaining the presence of hubs
The previous section of the paper indicated that the CBN nodes are not equal, that some 
advocates possess a higher degree and betweenness centrality. They are better connected 
than other CBN members and as a result they occupy a central position in this network. 
They keep the network connected and are in a good position to act as brokers. Their cen-
trality is a result of the deliberate choices that the network members made in order to facili-
tate information exchange, learning and decision-making in the network.
In the case of the CBN, hubs emerged as delegating communication and decision-mak-
ing tasks to them was found to increase the network efficiency, defined here as achieving a 
goal or completing a task with minimum resources. The hubs allowed the network to cam-
paign and achieve support for a ban in the European Parliament, despite limited resources. 
Limited time and financial resources determined certain CBN members to delegate inter-
national communication tasks, while concentrating on other aspects of the campaign:
I have not worked for instance with the persons in Bulgaria, but I know that they have 
achieved certain results. There is no need for me to forge a relationship with them, as 
somebody else in our group is connected to them (EAR2).
And:
normally the people from Alburnus Major [local social movement] are doing this and 
we support them, we set up this kind of support structure; it does not make sense to 
replicate these international communication structures (EAR7).
There was a special interest in not replicating some of the communication work that was 
already performed in the network. Consequently, the actors that performed these communi-
cation tasks became more important in connecting and integrating in the information flow 
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network segments based in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Belgium (particu-
larly in Brussels where the EU institutions are located). The information that members of 
the network exchanged was related to the regulatory framework applicable to cyanide in 
their home country, scientific studies on the impact of gold mining and, most importantly, 
information on their campaigning strategies. One interviewee stated that: ‘we engage in 
information exchange, on what works and what does not work or simply on strategies of 
communication’ (EAR10). The information exchange enabled different groups to learn 
from the campaign experience of activists in neighboring countries. Substantial amounts 
of learning on campaigning strategy took place as the campaigning evolved from national 
campaigns taking place in Romania or Hungary to an EU-wide campaign.
Being involved in the international communication required certain skills and this 
increased the chances of certain network advocates to emerge as brokers. In the case of the 
CBN, a good command of English gave certain network members a competitive advantage 
that allowed them to become brokers as the mother tongues (Romanian, Hungarian, Bul-
garian and Greek, etc.) of most of the people involved in the cyanide ban campaigning are 
very different (EAB2). For instance, the representatives of a local grassroots organization 
that opposes a cyanide-based mining project in the village of Rosia Montana, Central-West 
Romania, played an important role in the exchange of information between the Romanian 
cyanide ban campaign and the groups in the neighboring countries. Brokerage is particu-
larly important in the case of transnational networks where the national and ethnic differ-
ences are more likely to make an impact (Kahler 2009b).
As explained in an interview by the representative of a Romanian environmental NGO 
(EAR11), the people in charge of international information exchange on behalf of the 
Romanian group became ‘the repository of all the connections between the organizations.’ 
Stronger interpersonal relations developed between them and other actors who play the 
role of international communicators on behalf of groups in Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece. 
This allowed the representatives of national groups to establish themselves as information 
brokers within the network. Other members of the national groups are simply aware that 
those transnational informational connections exist, but they do not play an active role in 
maintaining them. They receive information by connecting with the members that make up 
the nerve center (EAR7, EAB3, EAH2). The members of the nerve center have consider-
able control over the information flows.
In the CBN, brokers do not only intermediate the exchange of information, but they 
also play a more important role in the decision-making process. According to a member 
central to the CBN, decisions regarding the international campaign need to be approved 
only by the members of the closed online group, of the ‘nerve center.’ To further speed the 
decision-making process, each member of the group needs to reply within 2 days to the 
proposals made by another member of the group. Silence is considered as being an affirma-
tive vote: ‘if somebody does not say no in 2 days, it means she/he says yes’ (EAR1). The 
existence of the ‘nerve center’ speeds up the decision-making process. Given this form of 
centralization, some network members have a more important word to say in the strate-
gies implemented in the international campaign than the peripheral network actors (EAB1, 
EAG1, EAR10).
CBN hubs benefit from a structurally privileged position, as well as formal recognition 
in the network. The interviews revealed that the network members are aware that certain 
network members are more active in networking internationally and they support these 
actors. The task of acting as network brokers was placed with them by members of the net-
work because they have good English language skills and international experience. Their 
overall impact on the network is perceived by the other network members as a positive 
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one. The presence of hubs indicates that the CBN is accommodating elements of hierarchy 
and, consequently, it is a hybrid structure. The CBN fulfills both conditions set by Kahler 
for hybrid structures (Kahler 2009b, 106) and discussed in more detail in the theoretical 
section of this paper. Namely, the CBN encompasses nodes that wield power through cen-
trality and accommodates hierarchy among its nodes. The power that central nodes display 
derives from the position they occupy in the structure of the CBN network. Members of the 
‘nerve center’ have more relational power than peripheral network actors.
6  Conclusion
This study is guided by two associated research questions. In answering the first research 
question ‘How are TANs structured?,’ this study shows that the CBN displays through its 
better connected and strategically placed nodes elements of hierarchy making it a hybrid 
social structure. Findings in this study are in contradiction to the widespread claim in the 
literature that policy networks are horizontal structures (Peterson 2010) or that TANs entail 
‘(in)voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange’ (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, 8). They also challenge the claim that a governance approach implies 
the horizontal dispersion of authority among a broad number of actors (Hix 1998; Eising 
and Kohler-Koch 1999; Krahmann 2003a).
When placing its findings in the context of other research on TANs, the case study con-
firms emerging assumptions regarding hierarchy in TANs developed in the literature, such 
as the work of Lake and Wong (2009) and Carpenter (2011). For instance, that TANs func-
tion ‘not as flat, distributed networks but as scale-free networks in which a small number 
of major “hubs” dominate, and pathways between peripheral nodes are dependent on these 
hubs’ (Carpenter 2011, 73). The paper shows that such influential hubs exist also in envi-
ronmental networks, in similar ways in which they exist in terrorist networks (Carley 2006; 
Enders and Su 2007) or state networks (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009).
Hubs (representatives of NGOs, INGOs and some leaders of social movements) are cen-
tral to the network. This is consistent with similar findings in the literature according to 
which NGOs often play a central role in networks by introducing: ‘new ideas, providing 
information, and lobbying for policy changes’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 9). Centrally posi-
tioned actors have been referred to as being the network ‘brokers’ and played an impor-
tant role in keeping alive the connections between more specific groups of network actors 
(social movements, scientists and politicians) and different network segments. There are 
five such segments: a Romanian, a Hungarian, a Bulgarian, a Greek and a Brussels-based 
network segment. The presence of these segments originating mainly in the CEE is not 
surprising given that the CBN advocated for the ban of cyanide-based mining technolo-
gies in the EU hoping in this way to reduce the chances of cyanide spills in the CEE, spills 
such as the one that took place at Baia Mare in 2000. CBN hoped that by preventing water 
and environmental pollution to contribute to the implementation of regional environmental 
agreements (the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the 
River Danube), as well as global agreements (the Convention on Biological Diversity). In 
constructing the argument for an EU ban, the network relied on the precautionary princi-
ple, a core principle of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
In answering the second research question ‘What relation is established between the 
TANs’ structure and their efficiency?,’ the research findings show hierarchy is integrated 
for the network to perform easier certain functions related to information exchange and 
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taking decisions in a reasonable timeframe. Networks are often praised for the absence of 
hierarchy and for their flatness (Watts 2003; Powell 1990); however, the findings on this 
case raise doubts regarding the advantages that flatness brings to a network.
The potential weaknesses of flat transnational networks have been less studied than 
their advantages. As a result, often researchers have emphasized the capacity of networks 
as horizontal structures to foster communication and learning (Powell 1990; Baker and 
Faulkner 1993; Podolny and Page 1998; Kenney 2006; Kenney et al. 2013). The findings 
of this study indicate that network members are willing to delegate the communication 
and decision-making tasks and in this way generate hierarchy. Delegating tasks allows the 
network members to remain efficient in their overall activity and the CBN to operate well, 
despite limited human resources. Additional empirical and quantitative studies need to be 
conducted to refine our understanding of the way transnational networks, in general, and, 
particularly, environmental TANs are structured and to assess what degree of hierarchy is 
optimal, but this study constitutes a good starting point.
Although questioned as being able to generate new insights on TANs (Keck and Sikkink 
1998), social network analysis can help to better analyze and map the structure of trans-
national networks, as this paper showed. This method can generate quantitative evidence 
that reinforces and complements the initial qualitative findings. Social network analysis 
employed in longitudinal studies can further increase our knowledge on the way the struc-
ture of networks changes in time and hopefully will be employed for this purpose in future 
research.
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Appendix
Interviews with network members referenced in the article (includes only interviews of 
people explicitly referenced in the article, although forty-five people were interviewed for 
this study):
Abbrev. in the 
text (if appli-
cable)
Interviewee position/affiliation (Some 
individuals have multiple affiliations, 
declared at the moment of the interview; 
they were referenced in the study with 
their primary affiliation.)
Date/place of the interview
_ The President of the Romanian Academy 9 Dec. 2010, Bucharest, Romania
EAR1 Representative of a Romanian social 
movement
1 Sep. 2010, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
EAR2 Representative of a Romanian environ-
mental NGO
2 Sep. 2010, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
EAR3 Representative of a Romanian environ-
mental NGO
3 Sep. 2010, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
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Abbrev. in the 
text (if appli-
cable)
Interviewee position/affiliation (Some 
individuals have multiple affiliations, 
declared at the moment of the interview; 
they were referenced in the study with 
their primary affiliation.)
Date/place of the interview
EAR6 Representative of a Romanian environ-
mental NGO, Volunteer with a Roma-
nian social movement
6 Dec. 2010, Bucharest, Romania
EAR7 Representative of a Romanian environ-
mental NGO
14 Dec. 2010, Bucharest, Romania
EAR8 Representative of a Romanian environ-
mental NGO
7 Dec. 2010, Bucharest, Romania
EAR10 Representative of a Romanian NGO, 
Volunteer with a Romanian social 
movement
11 Dec. 2010, Bucharest, Romania
EAR11 Representative of a Romanian environ-
mental NGO, Volunteer with a Roma-
nian social movement
3 Sep. 2010, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
EAH1 Representative of ‘Friends of the Earth’ 
Hungary
27 Sep. 2010, Budapest, Hungary
EAH2 Representative of ‘Bankwatch’ Hungary 28 Sep. 2010, Budapest, Hungary
EAH3 Representative of ‘Greenpeace’ Hungary 28 Sep. 2011, Budapest, Hungary
EAH4 Member of the Green Hungarian Party 
LMP, Member of the Hungarian Parlia-
ment
27 Sep. 2010, Budapest, Hungary
EAH5 Volunteer at a Hungarian environmental 
NGO
16 Dec. 2010, Budapest, Hungary
EAB1 Representative of a Bulgarian NGO, affili-
ated with Central and Eastern Europe 
‘Bankwatch’ Network
11 Feb. 2011, Cambridge, UK/Sofia, 
Bulgaria
EAB2 Representative of Central and Eastern 
Europe ‘Bankwatch’ Network
16 Feb. 2011, Cambridge, UK/Blageovgrad, 
Bulgaria
EAB3 Representative of a Bulgarian environ-
mental NGO
3 April 2011, Cambridge, UK/Plovdiv, 
Bulgaria
EAG1 Representative of a Greek NGO, 
representative of a Greek local social 
movement
10 Feb 2010, Cambridge, UK/Olympias, 
Greece
EAG2 Lecturer at ‘Aristotle’ University of Thes-
saloniki, volunteer with a Greek local 
social movement
24 Feb 2010, Cambridge, UK/Thessaloniki, 
Greece
EAG3 Lecturer at ‘Aristotle’ University of Thes-
saloniki
8 April 2011, Cambridge, UK/Thessaloniki, 
Greece
MEPA1 Assistant to a Hungarian MEP 17 Dec. 2010, Budapest, Hungary
MEPA3 Assistant to a Greek MEP 2 March, Brussels, Belgium
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